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Thomas G. Rosenmeyer 
University of Washington 
JUDGMENT AND THOUGHT IN THE THEAETETUS 
The variety of meanings attached to the term doxa has been a cause of 
concern to many scholars.1 The tendency has been to look for a gradual 
and tolerably consistent change in Plato's understanding of the term, in 
tune with what is thought to have been his philosophical development. At 
the same time it is often recognized that the distribution of the various 
senses of doxa between earlier and later dialogues does not always warrant 
this perspective. One of the results of this general uncertainty about 
the status of doxa has been that translators have variously rendered it 
"opinion" or "belief" or "judgment," to mention only the three most promi­
nent renderings. All will agree that this is an unfortunate situation. 
The present paper will attempt to show that, certainly in the Theaetetus, 
but probably elsewhere in ?lato also, all three translations are subject 
to criticism. Doxa in the sense of "belief ,11 i.e., as signifying the con­
viction of the truth of something, is extremely rare in Plato, as is doxa 
in the sense of "judgment," i.e., as signifying the discursive combining 
of two or more initially separate terms into a proposition;2 and the 
word 11opiniori11 in English raises an expectation that it will be followed 
by a subordinate clause, which is only infrequently the case in Greek. 
A typical case of doxa being used j_n a sense other than "judgment" 
occurs at Charm. 158E7 ff. Socrates seems to suggest that if Charmides 
possesses a balanced personality (sophro�yne) he.should be able to judge 
what that is, i.e., he should be able to make a. statement of identity, or 
a classification in terms of genus and species. But though we might put 
things that way, that is not the sort of language which Socrates or his 
interlocutors would understand. Socrates really means to say that if 
you have something, you must have a conception of it which you ought to 
be able to put into words. The word _sophros;yy\e will not do because for 
the present purposes it is regarded as an unknown, like the name of a man 
whom we have not met. If you truly have the reality corresponding to the 
name you are looking for, its presence within you ought to precipitate an 
awareness, a thought, which acc_ording to the teachings of Prodicus wilJ 
perhaps be articulable in more ways than one. If you can find an articu­
lation which because of its associations with names known to you produces 
in you a greater feeling of familiarity than sophrosyne would, then 
you will gladly ·substitute the new term for the old. We might ,say that 
the activity which Socrates encourages Charmides to undertake is the mak­
ing of ,a judgment, the combination of two knowns in a meaningful relation­
ship. For Socrates, the apparent equation of sophrosyne a:r;id calmness 
which follows is the substitution of a more familiar term articulating a 
more distinct concept, for a less familiar term articulating a less dis­
tinct concept or thought. The substitution happens to be mistaken. But 
there is nothing discursive about doxa and the verb doxazein as here used; 
doxa simply designates the thought prompted more or less spontaneously :rn 
the soul by the presence, also in the soul, of the reality which the 
thought reflects. 
I suggest that in Plato doxa should be translated "thought," and 
doxazein "think" wherever they occur. Such a policy would have several 
obvious advantages. One, it would avoid the bewildering variety of trans­
lations now in force; two, it would take Plato's use of one and the same 
word in various contexts as a hint that what is designated by it is one 
and the same sort of thing (it is always dangerous to assume lightly 
that Plato uses his terms negligently); and three, it would force us to 
investigate further the precise nature of what Plato chooses to denote 
by the term. The analysis of some of the uses of doxa in the Theaetetus 
which follows is designed to attempt the beginnings of an answer to the 
last point. 
* 
What is the relationship between aisthesis (sense-perception)3 and 
doxa? In the earlier part of the Theaetetus they are not differentiated, 
for the simple reason that according to Protagoras all thoughts are ul­
timately of perceptual objects. If there is a distinction, it is merely 
that doxa, instead of being identical with aisthesis, may occur through 
aisthesi"S, or may be the awareness of an aisthesis. But since the term 
aisthesis is used in the sense of "result in the soul" as well as "pro­
cess which causes the result," and since all perception as distinct from 
the mechanical motions which enter into perception is conscious, the 
realities designated by the two terms are, to begin with, not distinct. 
But when, 187A ff., the claim of sense perception to be knowledge 
has been thrown out of court, and Socrates proceeds to focus on the sort 
of cognition which can occur independently of sensation, he lays the 
foundation for a distinction between aisthesis and doxa. Earlier, i•the 
work of the soul by herself" had meant the kind of perceiving which goes 
hand in hand with the sensing through the organs, the perceiving of being 
and difference and numbers which is a necessary part of every complex 
perception.4 Now Socrates begins to mean by the "work of the soul by 
herself" the thinking which may go on in the absence of any immediate 
perception. And this thinking he calls doxazein, 187a8.5 Such thinking 
now is held to apprehend objects which, if we were talking of direct per­
ception, would include objects of physical sensation: I think "stone." 
Thus, of the two meanings of the phrase "'the work of the soul by herself," 
the first, i.e., perception minus the elements contributed by the sense 
organs, is dispensed with in favor of the second, i.e., thinkinr,, in the 
absence of direct perception, of objects otherwise apprehended by sense 
perception. And in the end, doxa comes to mean "thinking" of perceptual 
objects, whether the act of perception is prior in time or not. In the 
fourth examination of error, for instance (191A8 ff.), doxa is triggered 
by sensation and memory, and becomes itself a kind of perception. But, 
initially at least, as is indicated by the premises of the first, second 
and third examinations of error (cf. below, appendix), no immediate appre­
hensign via the sense organs seems to be involved in the making of a · doxa. 
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Even where, however, doxa is not identical with perception, it is 
analogous to it. In the fourth examination of error, on the occasion of 
describing the wax tablet, Socrates 191D6 ff. parallels perceptions and 
thoughts as both effecting memory when stored or registered on the tab­
let. And a little later. at 195A7, Socrates suggests that those whose 
retained impressions, i.e., former perceptions now filed away on the 
tablet, are indistinct and confused. will not, when faced with new im­
pressions, correlate them properly but 11see and hear and think amiss." 
Error, thus, is a matter of faulty vision or hearing or thinking; 
thought is paralleled with perception. Here, as elsewhere in Plato, it 
is apparent that thinking is prompted by objects precisely as hearing 
and smelling are. But if it is correct to say that thought is analogous 
to perception, then doxa cannot be judgment. The most characteristic 
thing about those who have true doxai, and the point in which they fall 
most distinctly short of rationa'f understanding, is their complete lack 
of the capacity or willingness to initiate a mental act and to operate 
dialectically, to combine and analyze,? In the dream which is related 
near the end of the Theaetetus and which is occasioned by the difficulty 
of the word logos, it is said that a true doxa as distinct from knowledge 
does not have logos (20288 ff.), It must be admitted, of course, that 
this line of attack fails; it is impossible to arrive at a definition of 
knowledge by starting from perception or its analogue thought. But the 
readiness to assume without further question that doxa as such does not 
involve logos must count for something. As we shall see, even when doxa 
is combined with logos in some other fashion it need not be, and perhaps 
cannot be judgment. 
Throughout the five examinations of error, error is conceived of as 
false thought rather than false judgment. Cornford, though in general 
committed to the translation "judgment," seems to have felt that this. 
was not always the appropriate rendering. for on occasion he speaks. of 
"notion or judgment,118 or "belief," But false doxa is neither false 
judgment nor false belief, as a hurried glance at some of the stages in 
the fivefold examination of error will show. In the second examination. 
for instance, Socrates argues (188D3 ff.) that thinking something which 
does not exist is impossible, just as it would be impossible to perceive 
something which is at the same time nothing. In other words, that which 
is not, is nothing. Now on the premise that Plato is talking about 
judgments this sort of talk is patently casuistic, and some critics have 
asked us to recognize a sophistic element in the argument.9 But if 
doxazein is merely 11 to think,11 the argument is quite in order. You can­
not think a nothing. In terms of mere being and not-being. error is 
impossible. 
In the fourth examination(l94A3), making an error is compared to an 
archer trying to hit the goal but missing it. That is to say, the soul 
thinks x, while she should have thought y. Again, no judgment seems tC) 
be involved. Similarly in the fifth examination error is thought of as 
a wrong grabbing, or rather the grabbing of the wrong bird. In all 
these cases, doxa means 11notion11 or "thought" rather than the combina­
tion of two or more notions into a judgment.10 
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The same thing remains true after the refutation of the second thesis, 
that knowledge is true doxa. When in the course of exploring the value of 
the third thesis that knowledge is true doxa plus logos, Socrates 207Al ff. 
takes true doxa plus logos to be a corr�ct enumeration of the parts of 
a complex object of thought (in this case, the parts of a wagon), agai11 
no judgment is involved. I think "wheel" and "axle" and "box," and 
though I think them in sequence rather than in the fashion in which I 
would perceive them if the wagon were present to my senses, I do not make 
the sort of connexi.on between them which would render a judgment. 
Can there be a doxa of a simple, i.e., of an irreducible phenomenon 
corresponding to an irreducible Form? Perhaps the chief difference be­
tween a perception proper and a doxa is that for the former, its object 
always contains the element of existence, whereas for the latter it does 
not. That is to say, a perception, even if put in the form "Green grassl", 
really means: "This is green grass," while the thought "green grass," 
though always, if sometimes very indirectly, referable to an external 
existent, does not as such contain a reference to the existence of the 
object. But though existence need not be a constituent of the thought­
datum, there are other constituents which prevent the Platonic doxa from 
ever being the doxa of a simple. For instance, as Plato puts it in the 
course of investigating the third thesis (209Dl-2): "The true thought of 
anything must • • • include the differentness of that thing.11 1 Even 
earlier, in his account of the dream, Socrates had touched on this 
(202B6); he there distinguished doxa from sensation by saying that the 
latter apprehends simples, the former complexes (syllabai).12 Simples. 
cannot be talked about or known, they can only be sensed; complexes can 
be known and referred to in speech and thought by true thought. To be 
sure, Plato subsequently seems to challenge this distinction when, 206Al 
ff., he cites the evidence of the alphabet against the notion that a com­
plex is more easily apprehended than a simple; elements, he suggests, 
produce a more distinct apprehension than complexes and produce such an 
apprehension more effectively, for letters are learnt more clearly and 
with greater ease than syllables of words. But the force of this chal­
lenge, based as it is on the premises of the dream, is more apparent than 
real. For a letter of the alphabet may be simpler than a written word, 
but it is by no means a simple object of perception or thought. In 
Plato's philosophy, in spite of the curious allegations of the dream, a 
simple can be neither perceived nor thought nor articulated. 
We must now consider some modern testimony to the effect that thought 
without judgment is impossible; further, we must take up some Platonic 
texts which at first glance seem to advance the same proposition. Suse­
mihl speaks as most Platonic scholars do when he says: "Hence the concept 
is the first result of reflection.11 3 Among recent philosophers, C. D. 
Broad distinguishes between "seeing" and "thinking" by saying that "a 
percept:ual situation is 1intuitive1, whilst a thought-situation with the 
same kind of epistemological object is 'discursive' • • • • I do not wish 
to deny that there may be something intuitive in every thought-situation 
and something discursive in every perceptual situation •• • •  1114 It is a 
nice question, which I have not been able to. resolve for rt,yself, ·whether 
according to Plato's teaching perception and thought can share the same 
epistemological object. Certainly in the Theaetetus it appears 
as if Plato thought they could. 
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At any rate, when Broad proceeds to demonstrate the discursive character 
of thought by stressing the fact that we use a preposition, "thinking 
about" or "of," rather than the simple accusative case to refer to the 
object, his case becomes hopeless, for not only is this not true in 
Greek, it is not necessarily true in English either. Even Reid had 
said: "We may dist:mctly conceive a proposition, without judging of it 
at all.1115 Of the two thoughts "tree" and "Theaetetus is handsome," 
the latter may be described as the mental correlate of a proposition. 
But it is the former type which seems to be important for Plato, appar­
ently furnishing him with his cue for treating the second type of 
thought also as if it were of an intuitively apprehended complex object. 
Plato cannot do anything.· else. In his account of perception, 156C6 ff. , 
also 182AJ ff., he includes the perception of a quality in the act of 
perception itself. I see whiteness or handsomeness along with the vari­
ous other elements included in the complex object of vision. But if 
this is so, then, when Theaetetus is perceived, his handsomeness is 
p art of the original perceptual object, and the apprehension of hand­
someness is included in the perception of Theaetetus. And when the 
thought "Theaetetus is handsome" occurs independently of direct percep­
tion, it is ,merely the recapturing of a previous perception, or rather 
the selection and subsequent articulation of a small fraction of the 
complex originally perceived. 
What, then, is a doxa of things to come? For, ostensibly in rebuttal 
of the sensationalist relativism of Protagoras, but really in support of 
Protagoras' contention that the area of good and bad allows for some 
limited expertise, Socrates shows, 178B9 ff., that experts are better 
prognosticators of the things which will happen in the future than non­
experts. As far as the major question "What is knowledge" is concerned, 
tM:s section of the dialogue contributes effectively to the ultimate 
finding that it is not sensation. But this does not concern us at the 
moment. A false doxa of things to come should, one supposes, be ex­
pressed in a proposition containing a verb in the future tense. But 
Plato's language speaks against this. The whole discussion is conducted 
as if the wrongness of the non-expert were not a matter of faulty judg­
ment but a matter of delusion; he has the wrong presentiment, he 
thinks-before (prodoxaz,ei 178E5) "sweet" rather than 11bitter.11 Prog­
nostication, in these terms, is closer to prophecy, the present aware­
ness of an anticipated future experience, or rather the experiencing in 
the present of what is not yet apprehensible by ordinary mortals, than 
to a judgment formed on the basis of premises. And it seems to differ 
very little from the kind of thing which Protagoras is talking about 
when he credits the expert with the capacity of causing a person who 
has had bad phainomena to have good phainomena (166D6-8). Take a man A 
who thinks "bitter" when eating a certain food. The expert, proceeding 
from the correct or healthy presentiment, changes the man A into the 
man B; as a result, the man B thinks 11sweet11 when eating the same food. 
This transformation, the implanting of healthier perceptions and thoughts 
in the citizens, is achieved by the expert by means of persuasion rather 
than teaching; he affects not the reasoning processes but the "emotions" 
or, as we might say more correctly, the perceptual tendencies of his 
subjects. This is what Socrates puts into the mouth of Protagoras, and 
there is nothing to suggest that it does not reflect Plato's own feel·­
ings in the matter. 
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A new difficulty is introduced when in the third examination of error, 
189E4 - 190A6, Socrates makes a distinction between doxa and doxazein. 
The latter seems to be identified with "reflecting" "(d'ianoeisthai) or the 
dialogue of the soul with herself, while the former is said to be the�­
sult of doxazein. The dialogue of the soul is 11about the things which 
she inspects." Thus we seem to have three different phases: (1) the 
soul inspects objects; (2) the soul converses with herself concerning 
these objects; and (3) the soul arrives at a decision concerning them. 
The difficulty with all this is that elsewhere in the same examination 
(a) "inspecting" (skopein) and "thinking" (doxazein) seem to be identi­
fied, 189CJ-4 (cf. also the paralleling of "thinking" [doxazon] and 
"touching" [ephaptomenos], 190C6, also 190D9-10); and (b) the internal 
conversation of the soul and the final decision are l)Ot always dis­
tinguished; either may be called doxazein: 190D4-8 . 16 The terminological 
uncertainty affecting the argument appears to mirror a major difficulty 
which may well be obliquely hinted at by Socrates' ironic remark, 189E7, 
that he is giving his explanation without knowing anything about the sub­
ject: a re-emphasis of Socrates1 traditional attitude which is rather 
rare in the logical part of the Theaetetus. 
The point is that Plato allows himself to be swayed by such terms 
as "reflecting" (dianoeisthai), "conversing" (dialegesthai) and "stock­
taking" (syllogizesthai) to approximate "thinking" to considering and 
,judging. From what we have established about the complex nature of the 
object'of doxa, it follows that once a doxa is articulated it is likely 
to be expressed in terms of subject and predicate (206Dl ff.). The 
soul assembles certain data originally submitted by a combination of 
sensation and her own proper activity, and thus produces a thought. 
This process of assembling may properly be called a "stock-taking" or a 
"conversing with herself ,11 but it should be understood that such stock-
taking or internal dialogue does nothing more than re-create the 
original perceptual structure, and that it is not experienced on the 
level of consciousness. The man, as distinct from his soul, becomes 
aware only of the final product of this operation within the soul, 
namely the thought. This is what Plato seems to have in mind when in 
the Sophist (264A8 ff.) he calls thought a 11 realization11 or "conclusion" 
of considering (dianoias apoteleutesis): 11 • • • considering is a convers­
ing of the soul with herself, and doxa :i.s a realization of considering 
, ,  • •  n (cf. Theaet. 189E6-7). The conversation is a silent conversation, 
it is 2re-verbal, a conversation only in the figurative sense of the 
word.lr In fact, the whole section about tpe soul conversing is a meta-
phor to account for the complexity of doxa .18 · 
Now what Plato does is, for a brief moment, to neglect the differ­
ence between this unconscious activity of the soul and the conscious 
process of judging. At one point in the third examination of error, 
190A9, Plato substitutes for his previous formulation of error, namely 
the thinking of one thing in the place of another (189C2-J), a new 
formulation to the effect that error is thinking that one thing is 
another, and gives as examples of this type of equation the thought 
that the fair is ugly, or that the unjust is just, or that the odd is 
even. Surely, Socrates hastens to remark, this kind of thought has 
never occurred to anyone even in his wildest dreams; not even a sick 
man or a madman would dare to persuade himself that an ox is a horse, or 
two is one. Hence error is impossible. ltJhat Plato has done here is to 
substitute the nonsensical judgment "the ox is a horse" for the perfectly 
legitimate thought "this is a horse,11 which is false but not nonsensical 
if the object I should have thought of is in fact not a horse but an ox. 
Plato's deviation from the logic of the argument is to be explained as a 
venture stimulated by the terms "considering" and "stock-taking" and 
"conversing" in an irrelevant judgmental sense. In any case, the venture 
is short-lived; it helps Socrates to present his interlocutors with a 
blind alley and force them into approaching the problem of error by means 
of a new examination which, incidentally, continues to operate with the 
notions of considering and stock-taking and comparing, but now in their 
proper sense -- proper within the context of the examinations of error -­
as unconscious activities of the soul. Hence the terms of the fourth and 
fifth examinations of error help to prove our contention that the opening­
up of a judgmental horizon in the third examination is illegitimate and 
abortive, and that Plato recognized it to be so. 
A further objection to the notion that doxa is not judgment, or, in 
other words, that a doxa is always of things and not about them, stems 
from the fact that in the Platonic text doxa is often followed by the 
preposition "about" (peri). That the objection has no force becomes evi­
dent from even a cursory perusal of the passages in question, for doxa 
per� and doxa followed by the simple (objective) genitive case (or 
doxazein peri and doxazein followed by the accusative case) are appar­
ently used without distinction, and often indeed within one and the same 
sentence.19 Peri, therefore, does not refer to the reality about which 
a judgment is made, but to the reality in the presence of which or 
through whose agency a thought implants itself in the soul. For this 
use of peri, roughly meaning 11with reference to" or "in connexion with," 
there are many parallels in Plato. Modern interpretation might hazard 
7 
the guess that, after doxa, peri points to the external object of thought 
while the simple genitive designates the thought-datum or thought-result. 
But it is very doubtful whether Plato meant to distinguish in principle 
between an object and a datum of thought or of any other type of cogni­
tion. The object of a thought is not dealt with separately from the con­
tent of the thought. The constituents of a complex thought object are to 
be rediscovered in the content of thought. False thought, like false per­
ception, is apprehending a complex object which either is not structured 
as the object which prompts it -- though the constituents are the same -­
or which is not the object expected or required, given the logic of the 
situation which produces the thought. That on either alternative there 
are serious psychological and philosophical difficulties which pres�; for 
clarification need not deter us. \rfuat matters is that for Plato both 
thought and perception can be false apparently because of the unrelia­
bility of the soul, which does not always respond truly to the prompt­
ings of the external object, having as she does an immense variety of 
memory imprints at her disposal, ready to be activated into thought at 
the slightest impulse. But without the postulate of the external exist­
ence of the objects of thought, whatever they are, Plato's epistemology 
would collapse, and the idealist interpreters would have the field to 
themselves. Hence Plato must say that false thinking is thinking an· 
object which is false or that the object which has stimulated the soul 




In the preceding, we have analyzed doxa as prompted either by a pres­
ent perception or by a past perception registered and resuscitated. 'i'here 
is, however, also a doxa prompted by a Form, or a complex of Forms. At 
the conclusion o.f the fourth examination of error, 195El ff., Socrates 
introduces the problem which later occasions the distinction between 
latent memory and actual recall, made in the course of the fifth exami­
nation. How can a man, he asks, when totalling 5 and 7, make the error 
of thinking that the sum is 11? The kind of doxa which Socrates has in 
mind here is different from the doxa discussedheretofore, because the 
objects of this do� are not perceptual objects, either present or past, 
but simple constituents of perceptual objects, of a kind which cannot be 
perceived by themselves. The thought "eleven" is analogous to the 
thought "white"; 11here are eleven men" is a thought analogous to the 
thought 11this is a white stone11; both 11white11 and 11eleven11 may function 
as constituents of a perceptual e:Xperience, but thought by themselves 
they point beyond perception to the world of' the Forms.21 
But are we referring to Forms when we think: "white plus black is 
grey"? In the eyes of some, perhaps, it is nonsense to say that when you 
combine the notion of white with the notion of black you obtain the notion 
of grey. But in Platonic terms this may not be absurd at all. In some 
contexts Plato apparently thought that the Form of white is white, and 
the Form of black is blacki hence the issue of any miscegenation between 
them1 if such a thing is possible (and I suspect it is) would be grey. 
Similarly when we think: 11white plus black is green11 we are not thinking 
nonsense but thinking falsely. So, you may think the Forms 5 and 7, and 
combine them into a sum, and make a mistake in doing so, without the 
slightest interference of the elements of sensation and perception 
which, it had been determined in the fourth examination, are the only 
factors which make false thinking possible. How can that be? 
I would like to propose that though Plato dQeS not pretend to give 
us a real solution of the puzzle, he does suggest, a way of solving it by 
treating 5 and 7 as if they were not Forms known to the soul but Forms 
unknown and therefore behaving much like perceptual objects dimly per­
ceived. We have seen that for Plato false thought is false naming or 
identification rather than false equation. I think a false thought 
when, under the influence of a misleading perceptual situation, the 
thought x or yx presents itself to me rather than the thought z or yz. 
Now that is precisely the sort of experience which is envisaged by 
Plato in the false summing of 5 and 7, except that 5 and 7 are not per­
ceptual objects (in spite of eskepsato, 196A5) but objects whose rela­
tion to 11 and 12 is merely analogous to the relation between percep­
tual objects and thought objects in the fourth examination of error. 
Since both 5 and 7, on the one hand, and 11 and 12, on the other, are 
objects of knowledge, Socrates broaches the question whether we ought 
not to distinguish between two types of knowledge. As is well known, 
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Second examination, 188C9 ff. Premise: there is only t. 
Consequence: 
11 
On the analogy of the impossibility of C --� sC and C --7 sC, 
( C --"t tC: impossible 
( 
( C --� tC: impossible 
I have bracketed the two formulations because in the text they do not ap­
pear separately. Rather, the text could be interpret(3d to mean the one 
or the other, Since, however, the second formulation postulates the non­
existence of the external object, which is impossible in Platonic terms, 
the fi.rst formulation would seem to be the appropriate one if a choice had 
to be made. 
Third examination, 189Bl2 ff, Premise: there is only t. 
Consequence: 
cl --7. tc2: impossible. 
The third examination differs from the first in that no memory is involved; 
it differs from the second in that more than one object of thought if: ,n­
volved. 'The formulation (cl and c2) --7 t(11cl = cZ11) is briefly con­
sidered by. Socrates, only to be rejected as nonsensical. However, it is 
nonsensical only because of Socrates' sleight-of-hand premise that c1 and 
c2 are contraries or incompatibles. Actualll, Platonic diaeresis offers 
many examples in which (cl and c2) --� t(11C = c211) is regarded as valid, 
or plausible. Take such a statement as 11 rhetoric is a humoring art11 (Gor­
gias 46JA6 ff.). By thus prejudicing the plausibilj.ty of the judgmental 
formulation, Plato clearly means to keep it out of the running during the 
present discussion.24 
Fourth exarn:i.na ti on, 191A2 ff. Premise: there are m, m, s, s and t.2.5 
Consequences: 
A: Csml --1 t(Csm2): impossible Examples: 192D3 ff.' E8 ff. 
B: Cs ml --� t(csm2): impossible 19JA8 ff. 
C: Csml --� t(Csm2): impossible 193Bl ff. 
D: Csml --j t(Csm2): impossible 
E: Csml --1 t(Csm2): impossible 
J:t"': Csml --� t(csm2): impossible 
G: csml 
-- � t(CSni2): impossible; = c 193Bl ff. 
12 
I-I: Csml --� t(Csm2): impossible 
I: Csml --� t(Csm2): impossible 19JD10 ff. 
J: Csm1 --.;. t(Csm2): impossible 
K: Csml -
-� t(csm.2): impossible 
L: csm1 --� 
; 
t(c5m2): impossible; = c, G 
M: csm.l --� t(Csm2): impossible; = H 
N: Csm1 ---7> t(Csm2): impossible; = D 
Thus, under A to N, 10 cases are considered and declared impossible. Not 
considered are the following 6 cases: 
Csml 
---> t(Csm2) 
Csml --1 t(csm.2) 
Csml --1 t(Csm2) 
Csm1 --� t(Csm2) 
Csml --� 
t(Csm2) 
csrnl __ ,;.> t(csm.2) 
Finally, Plato determines three cases in which error is possible: 
0: (Csml and Csm2) 
__ ,, t(cslm2) 19JD5 ff., 194A6 ff, 
P: (Csm.l and Csm2) --� t(cslm2) ;26 
Q: (Csml and Csm2) --1 t(cslm2) and/or t(cs2m1). 19JB9 ff., E6 ff. 
The summation of the fourth examination is given at 194B2-6: for error to 
be possible, there has to be bot!f s and m. When they are both distinct 
and clear, sl goes with ml and s2 with m2 (cases I, J, and K) and error 
is ruled out. But when s is indistinct and m shallow, sl may go with m2 
or s2 with ml (cases O, P and Q), and then error occurs. The example of 
Q, 19JB9 ff., shows that in o, P, and Q, cl and c2 are understood as 
operating simultaneously. My chief argument for the suggestion that 0 
and P are not identical with any of the six cases of which I say that 
they are not discussed, is that if they were, Q would have to be identi­
cal with I, which it plainly is not. What a compound of one sensation 
with another memory could be like is difficult to imagine. Plato has 
not yet, at tM.s stage, distinguished between two types of m, possession 
and holding, or latent and actual. 
Transition from the fourth to the fifth examination, 195El ff. 
Socrates ostensibly suggests that case A of the fourth examination is 
possible after all, seeing that we can confuse 11 and 12, i.e., 
11 --� t(l2). This seems to show that error may be possible without 
the operation of s, purely on the level of m. 
Fifth examination; 196Dl ff. Premise: there is only t, m, and ffi, 
13 
but m may be either m (latent memory) or M (positive recall): 197B4 ff. 
Consequence: 
if c1 plus c2 equals c3, 4 
__ _, t(CM ) • 
After first assuming that this is possible (199Bl ff.), Socrates immedi­
ately turns around (199C7 ff.) and questions the possibility, on grounds 
which have struck commentators as obscure. Theaetet�s then suggests that 
perhaps in addition to m and M, there is also ffi and M, but this sugges­
tion is refuted by Socrates (20081 ff.) along the lines taken in the first 
examination. In the end, the distinction between m and M seems to be 
dropped, and the error in question, i.e. , 
115 plus 7 equals 11" comes -; _, 
be regarded as a simple case of c3 --7 t(c4), which is of course im­
possible. 
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1) A pertinent discussion may be found in any one of the standard treat­
ments of Platonic philosophy. Two recent studies specifically devoted 
to the problem of doxi!-. may be singled out for mention: H. Per ls, 
PlatQ!!: Sa Conception du Kosmos (New York 1945) chs. vi and vii; and 
C. A. Viano, "Il significato della doxa nella filosofia di Platone,11 
Rivista di Filosofia 43 (1952) 167-185. Both Perls and Viano, like 
most other writers who have dealt with Platonic doxa, are interested 
in the relationship between dox� and the several other cognitive 
capacities and activities rather than in the psychological structure 
or mode of operation of doxa itself. For some reason, the question: 
how precisely does doxa operate and what does it do? has only rare:l.J 
been asked. A notable exception to this rule is N. R. Murphy, who 
has a searching though largely inconclusive investigation of the 
meaning of doxa in the RepubliQ in his 'The Int�etation of Plato 1 s 
Republic (Oxford 19.51) ch. vi. References to the Platonic text are 
given according to John Burnet1s edition in the Bibliotheca Oxoniensis. 
2) In the sequel I shall use the terms "discursive" and "intuitive." In 
discursive thinking, consciousness of the whole comes after conscious­
ness of the parts; in intuitive thinking, the whole is apprehended 
before it is analyzed into parts. 
J) Plato uses the term aisthesis indifferently to refer both to the work 
of the sense organs, i.e., the purely physical processes whereby 
sense organ and sense object cause each other to establish contact 
with one another; and to the work of the soul which combines the data 
furnished by the senses and makes her own special contribution to 
create a perceptual awareness. The former type of aisthesis does 
not involve the soul at all. Hence the modern distinction between 
sensation and perception is not relevant to Plato's distinction be­
tween two types of aisthes:i.s. For our purpose, the purpose of trac­
ing the relation between aisthesis and doxa, i.t is the second type 
of aisthesis, perception via the soul, which counts. 
4) Cf. 185Cl.i- ff. The perception of non-sensory items must not be con­
fused with the intuiting of Forms. 
5) In spite of the apparent agreement between this formulation and Plato's 
"deviation" concerning judgment at 186B6 (cf. text, pp. 6-7), the ex­
amples used in the subsequent fivefold examination of error dernonst'"lte 
that "the work of the soul by herself" in the sequel does not mean 
"reflection upon the Forms themselves." 
6) For doxazein, Plato occasionally uses other terms such as oie0Ba1. 
(Theaet. 191E6 ff.), �ye'C0Ba1. (188B7), et<; .. �v 01.6:vo1.av t-a�e'Cv 
(188B9), TO 01.avotq 't"t-8e0Ba1, (189D8); cf. Viano (above, note 1) 177• 
This oscillation of terms reflects the stylistic peculiarity of the 
Theaetetus, which is at one and the same time a rigorous exercise in 
logic and a document of belles lettres. 
7) Cf. Meno 98Al ff., especially the comparison of those who have true 










F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (New York 1957) 155 middle. 
See, for instance, P. Friedlaender, Platon vol. 2 (Berlin 1930) 447. 
Miss W. Hicken, 11The Character and Provenance of Socrates' 'Dream' 
in the Theaetetus,11 Phronesis 3 (1958) 128 points to the image 
from the law-courts to support her opinion that "doxazein seems to 
mean 1to believe a proposition', i.e., that so-and-so stole from 
or did violence to someone else." I should rather say that the 
oratory of the advocates prompts the jurors to accept not so much 
a proposition but a fact: (there has been) theft, or (there has 
been) violence. Miss Hicken's 11so-and-so11 and "someone else" are 
not in the text. The datives oL� &noo•cpovµ£voL� • • •  BLaCoµ£voL� 
refer to the original fact, not the doxa inspired by the advocate. 
The lawyer manages to make his audie�experience the illusion of 
a perception; he supplies them with perceptual data in the absence 
of a process of perception. 
Socrates' argument at 209A7 ff. is slightly disingenuous. He is 
discussing the third sense of logos, i.e., 11account of specific 
difference.11 The thesis is that true doxa plus this sort of logos 
is knowledge. But, Socrates objects, does this mean that a true 
doxa does not apprehend the specific difference of its object? 
That would be impossible. -- Socrates is willing to overlook the 
obvious sue;gestion that true doxa certainly does include an aware­
ness of specific difference, but that this doxa does not become 
knowledge until the awareness has been promoted to the status of 
reflected consideration or analysis. Nevertheless, Socrates' 
objection shows clearly that for Plato the simple act of recogni­
tion -- for doxa here equals "awareness of object perceived pre­
viously" -- involves the perceptual acceptci.nce of a complex object. 
The alleged authority for the dream theory seems to be of the opin­
ion that not only unconscious physical sensation but perception via 
the soul is of simples, for he calls the simples namable: 202B2. 
But this is only one of the many infelicities of the theory which 
Plato himself would disavow. 
F. Susemihl, Die genetische Entwicklung der J:.>latonischen Dialoge 
(Leipzig 1855) 192. Cf. h.. E. Taylor, Plato (New York 1936) 339: 
"The common name for the process of reflection, comparison and dis­
crimination to which the occurrence of our sensations gives rise is 
1belief1 or. 'judgment' (doxa, to doxazon). The word doxa is being 
used here in a way characteristic of Plato's later dialogues • • •  
the meaning is judgment, intellectual conviction in general." Note 
the equating of judgment and conviction. 
C. D. Broad, The Mind and its Place in Nature (London 1925) 141-1-. 
SirW. Hamilton, ed., 'I'he Works of Thomas Reid vol. 1 (Edinburgh 
1895), "Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man," essay 4 ch. 3 
p. 375· 
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24) At 189E3 Socrates makes allowance for the tirne element required by 
the making of a judgment, though not by the thinking of a thought. 
Cf. Friedlaender (above, note 9) 447 note 2, who shows that the 
words are spoken by Socrates, not by Theaetetus. The allowance for 
duration, like the rest of the judgmental notions referred to in 
the third examination, is of no significance for the sequel of the 
discussion. 
25) I do.not understand Cornford's statement (above, note 16) 120 that 
this examination operates with a notion which had not been used be­
fore, i.e., memory. As seen above, the first examination operated 
with rn. Rather i� is s which is now added to the premises. 
26) At 192Cl0, the thought is to be completed as follows: �· ( sc. h 
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